What Happened in the Snowflake Data Breach?

The 2024 Snowflake data breach represents one of the most significant cybersecurity events of the decade, exposing fundamental vulnerabilities in cloud data management practices. Between April and June 2024, attackers compromised hundreds of organizations using Snowflake’s cloud data platform, exfiltrating sensitive records belonging to over 500 million individuals. This breach impacted major corporations like Ticketmaster, Santander Bank, Advance Auto Parts, and Neiman Marcus, with stolen data ranging from financial records to government-issued IDs. Forensic investigations revealed that threat actors exploited stolen credentials and systemic gaps in multifactor authentication (MFA) adoption to infiltrate Snowflake customer environments. The incident has sparked widespread litigation, regulatory scrutiny, and urgent calls for improved cloud security frameworks. This report examines the breach’s technical and organizational roots, its cascading effects across industries, and critical recommendations for preventing similar catastrophes.

Overview of the Snowflake Data Breach

Chronology of the Attack

The breach unfolded in three distinct phases. Initial intrusions began in mid-April 2024 when the cybercriminal group UNC5537 (operating under the alias ShinyHunters) deployed infostealer malware to harvest Snowflake customer credentials. By April 14, attackers had gained access to Advance Auto Parts’ Snowflake environment, maintaining persistent access for 40 days until May 24. Parallel intrusions affected Ticketmaster and Santander Bank during this window, with Mandiant researchers confirming that over 100 Snowflake customer environments were compromised by May 2024.

Snowflake first detected anomalous activity in late April but initially characterized the incident as impacting only a “limited number” of accounts. This assessment proved catastrophically inaccurate when ShinyHunters listed 590 million Ticketmaster records and 30 million Santander customer files on Breach Forums in June. Despite the FBI seizing this forum on June 16, the group relaunched operations on a replacement site within 72 hours, continuing data auctions that ultimately encompassed 165 organizations.

Technical Analysis of Attack Vectors

Credential Compromise and Authentication Failures

The breach’s root cause centered on two critical failures:

1. Stolen Credentials: Attackers obtained login credentials through infostealer malware campaigns targeting Snowflake customers’ employees. Mandiant’s investigation identified infections dating back to 2023, with credentials stored in unsecured Excel files and password managers.
2. Multifactor Authentication (MFA) Gaps: None of the breached Snowflake accounts had MFA enabled, allowing attackers to bypass authentication with stolen usernames and passwords alone. Snowflake’s delayed rollout of mandatory MFA—announced June 10, 2024—arrived too late to prevent the breach.

Exploitation of Snowflake’s Shared Responsibility Model

Snowflake operates under a shared security model where customers manage access controls while Snowflake secures infrastructure. This framework created critical blind spots:

• Customers assumed Snowflake handled threat detection, while Snowflake relied on clients to implement MFA and monitor credentials.
• Attackers exploited this ambiguity, using legitimate customer credentials to bypass Snowflake’s perimeter defenses undetected for weeks.

Malware Toolchain: FROSTBITE and SnowSight Exploits

UNC5537 deployed a custom toolkit dubbed FROSTBITE (aka “Raped Flake”) to automate data exfiltration. Key components included:

• SnowSight Exploit: A vulnerability in Snowflake’s web interface allowed attackers to escalate privileges from basic users to account administrators.
• Data Scraping Modules: Automated scripts harvested tables containing PII, PHI, and financial records at scale.

Organizational Impacts

Sector-Specific Consequences

Financial Services

Santander Bank lost 30 million customer records, including account balances and transaction histories. The bank faced immediate fraud attempts, with attackers using stolen SSNs to apply for lines of credit.

Retail and E-Commerce

Advance Auto Parts’ breach exposed 2.3 million job applicants’ driver’s licenses and Social Security numbers. Neiman Marcus suffered a parallel compromise of 70 million transaction records containing gift card data and customer IP addresses.

Entertainment and Ticketing

Ticketmaster’s 590 million record leak included payment card details and event attendance histories. Secondary markets saw a 300% increase in counterfeit ticket listings using stolen customer IDs.

Legal and Regulatory Fallout

Multidistrict Litigation

On October 4, 2024, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated 32 lawsuits against Snowflake into In re: Snowflake Data Security Breach Litigation (D. Mont. 2024). Plaintiffs allege:

• Negligent Security Practices: Failure to mandate MFA or detect credential misuse.
• Delayed Disclosure: Snowflake waited 45 days after discovering the breach to notify customers, violating GDPR and CCPA timelines.

Regulatory Penalties

The FTC opened an investigation into Snowflake’s compliance with the Safeguards Rule, which requires “reasonable” security measures for financial data. Advance Auto Parts faces a $28 million fine from the Vermont Attorney General for improper credential storage.

Cybersecurity Lessons and Recommendations

Mandatory MFA Adoption

Post-breach analyses confirm that MFA would have blocked 98% of the credential-based attacks. Cloud providers must transition from optional to enforced MFA, as Snowflake finally did in June 2024.

Credential Monitoring Best Practices

Organizations storing data in Snowflake or similar platforms should:

• Deploy continuous dark web monitoring for employee credentials.
• Rotate passwords every 90 days and after any third-party breach disclosure.

Revisiting Shared Responsibility Models

The breach exposed fatal ambiguities in cloud security ownership. Revised frameworks should:

• Clearly define threat detection responsibilities between provider and client.
• Require providers to alert customers about credential leaks from other breaches.

The Snowflake breach underscores systemic risks in modern cloud ecosystems, where fragmented security models and delayed MFA adoption create attack surfaces measured in millions of records. While Snowflake and its customers have since implemented stronger authentication protocols, the lasting damage to consumer trust and regulatory compliance landscapes will shape cloud security practices for years. Enterprises must treat this incident as a watershed moment, prioritizing credential hygiene and renegotiating shared security agreements to prevent history from repeating.